25 years ago, it was very rare to see a car with Eastern European plates in Western Europe. Now, they are all over the place, including trucks (why are there so many from Romania?). This is a clear indication, even if you ignore history, that the East-West integration is stronger than it has been for a long time. But there are more aspects to integration than the movement of cars.
Catherine and Klaus Prettner basically look whether the two regions are cointegrated. They build two national aggregates, one with 12 European Community countries (unfortunately no UK) and 5 Central European countries. Using a vector error-correction model with restrictions from a standard open-economy business-cycle model with cash-in-advance. Output shocks to one area spill over to the other, surprisingly in similar magnitudes in both directions. Interest rate shocks are expectedly asymmetric though: West impacts East, but East does not impact West. But given that all this has been in transition mode over the 1995-2009 sample, I really wonder how these impacts have changed over time. A framework with time varying coefficients would have been helpful here.
Showing posts with label recessions. Show all posts
Showing posts with label recessions. Show all posts
The impact of recessions on economist productivity
In recessions, those who have the hardest time finding jobs are those who try for the first time. Facing these difficulties, many decide to pursue their studies in graduate school. From this, one should expect future productivity to be higher in the future, because of the higher level of human capital. But for a given level of human capital, labor productivity should be lower post-recession, because the marginal new graduate is of lower quality.
Michael Boehm and Martin Watzinger look at the performance of PhD economists and find that those who studied or graduated during a recession over-perform the others as measured by publication records. That would not surprise me for those who graduated during tough times, as only the best get jobs. Indeed, the study matches those who graduated with those who are still members of the American Economic Association. Thus, there is some selection bias. But for those who start in a recession, and thus would graduate in "normal" times, given the average length of a recession, this is more surprising. Boehm and Watzinger can justify this with the good old Roy model of reallocation of talent: in a recession, people switch to recession proof sectors, and those who can do this the most easily are those who are about to choose in which sector to work: students. As the number of graduate students slots does not change much, at least in Economics, the quality of those admitted is higher, if the admission officers do their work well. As the publication record many years later shows, they do.
Michael Boehm and Martin Watzinger look at the performance of PhD economists and find that those who studied or graduated during a recession over-perform the others as measured by publication records. That would not surprise me for those who graduated during tough times, as only the best get jobs. Indeed, the study matches those who graduated with those who are still members of the American Economic Association. Thus, there is some selection bias. But for those who start in a recession, and thus would graduate in "normal" times, given the average length of a recession, this is more surprising. Boehm and Watzinger can justify this with the good old Roy model of reallocation of talent: in a recession, people switch to recession proof sectors, and those who can do this the most easily are those who are about to choose in which sector to work: students. As the number of graduate students slots does not change much, at least in Economics, the quality of those admitted is higher, if the admission officers do their work well. As the publication record many years later shows, they do.
Are multipliers larger than we thought?
In the last years, much of the debate on fiscal stimulus vs. austerity was centered on the measurement of government spending multipliers. And to a large extend this was a debate between those how used dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models, finding small multipliers, and those using reduced form models, finding large multipliers. Both strategies have pitfalls, the structural one in that the model may be miss-specified as it is always an abstraction of a complex reality, the reduced-form one because of the Lucas Critique.
Patrick Fève, Julien Matheron and Jean-Guillaume Sahuc make the point that there could be a source of downward bias in the estimation of the elasticity in structural models. It arises from ignoring the endogeneity of government expenses combined with complementarity between public and private consumption. With exogenous expenses, the elasticity is 0.97 for the United States, with endogenous ones, it is 1.31. No small potatoes.
Patrick Fève, Julien Matheron and Jean-Guillaume Sahuc make the point that there could be a source of downward bias in the estimation of the elasticity in structural models. It arises from ignoring the endogeneity of government expenses combined with complementarity between public and private consumption. With exogenous expenses, the elasticity is 0.97 for the United States, with endogenous ones, it is 1.31. No small potatoes.
Inter-provincial risk sharing in China
Despite widespread claims, China is still far from a capitalist economy. There is still a considerable amount of command-and-control, and the state-owned enterprises still comprise a large and heavily subsidized sector of the economy. One aspect of a command economy with a (still) poor finance and insurance sector is that it can enforce some sharing mechanism to alleviate the consequences of local business cycle shocks or offer some redistribution across geographical regions. Such mechanisms are also in place in Western economies, mostly implicitly (for example, a national unemployment insurance) and when it is explicit, it leads to tensions as some always pay and some always receive (examples: Canada, Bolivia). Anyway, back to China.
Julan Du, Qing He and Oliver Rui find that the state-imposed fiscal channel of redistribution during the business cycle has a relatively minor impact: it dampens business cycle fluctuations by only 9%. A much larger impact comes from movements in labor, which is actually surprising as the state actively impedes such movement with an internal passport system and undocumented workers face major hurdles for public services. Still an in all, there is very little inter-provincial smoothing going on. I would have expected the central government to do a much better job in this case.
Julan Du, Qing He and Oliver Rui find that the state-imposed fiscal channel of redistribution during the business cycle has a relatively minor impact: it dampens business cycle fluctuations by only 9%. A much larger impact comes from movements in labor, which is actually surprising as the state actively impedes such movement with an internal passport system and undocumented workers face major hurdles for public services. Still an in all, there is very little inter-provincial smoothing going on. I would have expected the central government to do a much better job in this case.
The cost of US fiscal imbalance
It is obvious that the US government is currently spend more than normal. It is also obvious that the current level of deficits is not sustainable. But just how bad would it be if the current fiscal imbalance would be maintained? We have models that can calculate welfare costs of such policies, but because the current policy is not sustainable, it is impossible to solve them and get a number. The only solution we can have is to look at what it would cost to delay going back to a sustainable path.
Bertrand Gruss and José Torres do with a heterogeneous agent DSGE model. According to their results, postponing the return to a sustainable path (defined by a pre-crisis debt/GDP ratio) by two decades leads to a permanent loss of output of 17% and a consumption equivalence loss of 7%. That is gigantic. The losses come mostly from the long run, thus it is all about whether the short-term gain is worth the long-term cost. To understand this result, it is thus important to understand the model.
This is a model of occupational choice (entrepreneur/worker), with idiosyncratic employment risk, no borrowing at the individual level, distortionary taxation and lump sum government transfers. There is another public good, wasteful government spending. A major role of the government is thus to insure agents against shocks, which they can also self-insure with accumulating Treasury bonds. Everybody knows exactly the path of policy. There is no aggregate shock except for fiscal policy. To summarize, the only beneficial thing the government does is insure people against shocks, to some extend. Otherwise, the government is harmful: it takes away goods to destroy them and distorts household choices in adverse ways to finance this. It is then no surprise that almost any government spending is harmful, no matter what the circumstances. In particular, the fact that there could be, for example, a temporarily very high unemployment rate that justifies larger public expenses is ignored here.
In other words, the model ignores the potential benefits of current deficits. Not very useful.
Bertrand Gruss and José Torres do with a heterogeneous agent DSGE model. According to their results, postponing the return to a sustainable path (defined by a pre-crisis debt/GDP ratio) by two decades leads to a permanent loss of output of 17% and a consumption equivalence loss of 7%. That is gigantic. The losses come mostly from the long run, thus it is all about whether the short-term gain is worth the long-term cost. To understand this result, it is thus important to understand the model.
This is a model of occupational choice (entrepreneur/worker), with idiosyncratic employment risk, no borrowing at the individual level, distortionary taxation and lump sum government transfers. There is another public good, wasteful government spending. A major role of the government is thus to insure agents against shocks, which they can also self-insure with accumulating Treasury bonds. Everybody knows exactly the path of policy. There is no aggregate shock except for fiscal policy. To summarize, the only beneficial thing the government does is insure people against shocks, to some extend. Otherwise, the government is harmful: it takes away goods to destroy them and distorts household choices in adverse ways to finance this. It is then no surprise that almost any government spending is harmful, no matter what the circumstances. In particular, the fact that there could be, for example, a temporarily very high unemployment rate that justifies larger public expenses is ignored here.
In other words, the model ignores the potential benefits of current deficits. Not very useful.
Coping with the crisis in transition and developing countries
The recent crisis is a truly global phenomenon, yet we hear only about how the developing economies are struggling. There were some reports about food riots over the surge in primary good prices, and then these economies faded away from the limelights. While the BRIC have not relatively very well, what about the others?
Rasmus Heltberg, Naomi Hossain, Anna Reva and Carolyn Turk report that the fluctuations in the terms of trade and prices in general have been very hard on developing and transition economies. Using households level data from 17 countries, they observe that the crisis was in fact harder than in the developed economies where it originated. Indeed, there is mention of skipped meals, reduced education, increased crime and societal issues. While I would have expected the export sector to be most affected, it appears the informal sector, which mostly caters to domestic needs was hit the hardest. And we can only hope this will be over soon, as the impact seems profound and long-lasting.
Rasmus Heltberg, Naomi Hossain, Anna Reva and Carolyn Turk report that the fluctuations in the terms of trade and prices in general have been very hard on developing and transition economies. Using households level data from 17 countries, they observe that the crisis was in fact harder than in the developed economies where it originated. Indeed, there is mention of skipped meals, reduced education, increased crime and societal issues. While I would have expected the export sector to be most affected, it appears the informal sector, which mostly caters to domestic needs was hit the hardest. And we can only hope this will be over soon, as the impact seems profound and long-lasting.
I do not understand US policy
The current situation in the US can be summarized in the following way: the economy is growing again, although not yet as fast as steady state, and unemployment is still high. Most sectors are doing kind of OK except for the construction sector, which operates roughly at half capacity. Budgets deficits are very high, but not at record level once you factor in cyclical effects. Inflation is moderate and on target around 2%, including its expectations. Everyone is sitting on a lot of cash and nominal interest rates are minimal. The crisis has been going on since 1997, 4.5 years.
What is the Federal Reserve doing? Keep in mind that it cannot address structural issues in the economy and cannot only boost the economy in the short term, if at all. Bernanke and co. are keeping interest rates rock bottom until at least 2014. That would be seven years of emergency measures. If you want to instill some confidence in the economy, you do not go about telling everyone the economy needs to stay in the emergency room three more years.
And by the way, if inflation is targeted at 2% and nominal interest rates are at zero for the foreseeable future, that means real interest rates are negative. Take any model and throw in negative real interest rates. The result are pretty ugly, especially if this is more than temporary. Yet this is what the Fed seems to be advocating.
And why would you need such low interest rates? A Taylor rule would call for low interest rates if inflation (or inflation expectations) are too high (correction: too low). They are not. Or if output is below potential. That may well be the case, but I do not think it is to the extend that the Fed believes it is. The rhetoric coming from the Board indicates that the potential output is simply a continuation of the trend line from before the crisis. I do not think it is adequate. The construction sector is gone, and is going to be gone for a while because of an oversupply of residences and structures. Most households suffered a significant wealth shock that is not going to recuperate soon, and consumption has shifted down. Long time unemployed are simply not employable because of sectoral reallocation. Potential GDP has suffered a permanent shock, and while it will get back to the usual trend growth, it will not get back of the previous path.
For the Fed, this means that it is currently chasing a target it will never be able to reach. Its estimate of potential GDP is much too excessive. And the difference is due to structural issues the Fed does not have the means to address.
Which brings us to fiscal policy. Temporary tax cuts of various sorts are good to address temporary weaknesses in consumption. They work best when targeted towards people with high propensities to consume. These are the poor, and more generally the liquidity constrained. These are not the rich, and certainly not everyone. And if the loss in consumption is permanent, then this cannot be address with such temporary measures. You just have to accept it and live with it. Thus: taxes need to go back up, especially for the rich, also because they got an unnecessary free ride in the past years.
And then there is the sectoral problem. Construction is in the dumps. If you want to do something about it, you target public spending towards construction. Not general tax cuts, not across the board stimulus. And the US could actually need some serious infrastructure replacement and improvements. Actually, it is the perfect time to catch up on lost time here: costs are low, interest rates are low.
Now there is of course the stimulus package. But it has had no impact because it was not sufficiently targeted towards infrastructure, It went to state governments, which just used this manna to avoid getting into debt. It went into all sort of pet projects, very few of which had anything to do with construction. And if there was some construction, it went into initiatives that have such long horizons that they are not going to help anytime soon.
So what needs to be done? Washington needs to acknowledge that the targeted path is too ambitious. Bring interest rates back up, This will entice people and businesses to do something with all the cash they are sitting on. The US Treasury needs to focus on infrastructure spending and restructure tax rates. And do not tell me we first have to wait until the presidential election is over.
What is the Federal Reserve doing? Keep in mind that it cannot address structural issues in the economy and cannot only boost the economy in the short term, if at all. Bernanke and co. are keeping interest rates rock bottom until at least 2014. That would be seven years of emergency measures. If you want to instill some confidence in the economy, you do not go about telling everyone the economy needs to stay in the emergency room three more years.
And by the way, if inflation is targeted at 2% and nominal interest rates are at zero for the foreseeable future, that means real interest rates are negative. Take any model and throw in negative real interest rates. The result are pretty ugly, especially if this is more than temporary. Yet this is what the Fed seems to be advocating.
And why would you need such low interest rates? A Taylor rule would call for low interest rates if inflation (or inflation expectations) are too high (correction: too low). They are not. Or if output is below potential. That may well be the case, but I do not think it is to the extend that the Fed believes it is. The rhetoric coming from the Board indicates that the potential output is simply a continuation of the trend line from before the crisis. I do not think it is adequate. The construction sector is gone, and is going to be gone for a while because of an oversupply of residences and structures. Most households suffered a significant wealth shock that is not going to recuperate soon, and consumption has shifted down. Long time unemployed are simply not employable because of sectoral reallocation. Potential GDP has suffered a permanent shock, and while it will get back to the usual trend growth, it will not get back of the previous path.
For the Fed, this means that it is currently chasing a target it will never be able to reach. Its estimate of potential GDP is much too excessive. And the difference is due to structural issues the Fed does not have the means to address.
Which brings us to fiscal policy. Temporary tax cuts of various sorts are good to address temporary weaknesses in consumption. They work best when targeted towards people with high propensities to consume. These are the poor, and more generally the liquidity constrained. These are not the rich, and certainly not everyone. And if the loss in consumption is permanent, then this cannot be address with such temporary measures. You just have to accept it and live with it. Thus: taxes need to go back up, especially for the rich, also because they got an unnecessary free ride in the past years.
And then there is the sectoral problem. Construction is in the dumps. If you want to do something about it, you target public spending towards construction. Not general tax cuts, not across the board stimulus. And the US could actually need some serious infrastructure replacement and improvements. Actually, it is the perfect time to catch up on lost time here: costs are low, interest rates are low.
Now there is of course the stimulus package. But it has had no impact because it was not sufficiently targeted towards infrastructure, It went to state governments, which just used this manna to avoid getting into debt. It went into all sort of pet projects, very few of which had anything to do with construction. And if there was some construction, it went into initiatives that have such long horizons that they are not going to help anytime soon.
So what needs to be done? Washington needs to acknowledge that the targeted path is too ambitious. Bring interest rates back up, This will entice people and businesses to do something with all the cash they are sitting on. The US Treasury needs to focus on infrastructure spending and restructure tax rates. And do not tell me we first have to wait until the presidential election is over.
Tax rates over the business cycle
With all the talk about cyclical austerity measures, it is surprising that little is known about the cyclical behavior of tax rates. For one, the tax code is complex and it cannot be summarized by a single number. That can be done by looking at aggregates, but of course aggregate tax rates are endogenous to economic activity as soon as there is some progressivity.
This does not deter Carlos Vegh and Guillermo Vuletin who analyze various tax rates for 62 countries over 40 years, using top marginal rates for corporate and personal incomes, as well as VAT. The results are striking: there is no correlation of tax rates with the business cycle in developed economies, but they are noticeably procyclical in developing ones. Why would this be the case? A simple model can explain this. Public consumption is always procyclical, for example if private and public consumption are complements. If public consumption is a large share of national income, tax rates need to go up to sustain increased expenses in a boom. If the public consumption share is rather small, as is typically the case in developed economies, tax increases are not required.
This does not deter Carlos Vegh and Guillermo Vuletin who analyze various tax rates for 62 countries over 40 years, using top marginal rates for corporate and personal incomes, as well as VAT. The results are striking: there is no correlation of tax rates with the business cycle in developed economies, but they are noticeably procyclical in developing ones. Why would this be the case? A simple model can explain this. Public consumption is always procyclical, for example if private and public consumption are complements. If public consumption is a large share of national income, tax rates need to go up to sustain increased expenses in a boom. If the public consumption share is rather small, as is typically the case in developed economies, tax increases are not required.
On the ineffectiveness of a fiscal stimulus
When is a fiscal stimulus going to work? If you listen to economists these days, it would be difficult to know. One reason is that protagonists quickly become sidetracked by the associated political discourse. The other is that one would first need to define the fiscal stimulus. Depending on whether it is provided by tax rebates, public expenses or tax delays makes a big difference. Also, who is targeted matters a lot. Thus one needs to get the specifics of the fiscal stimulus to give a proper answer. The general rule, though, is that a fiscal stimulus works best if the credit or liquidity constraint households obtain additional cash. They are going to spend it right away. The other households would reduce consumption only slightly in anticipation of future increased taxes due to a wealth effect. In the aggregate, consumption would then go up, but not a lot. But there can be other circumstances where it would work better.
Thorsten Drautzburg and Harald Uhlig study a situation similar to the one now in the Unites States: nominal interest rates getting very close to zero. Then, they claim the fiscal multipliers are still rather small, but may be positive despite distortionary taxation. Now contrast this with the results of Lawrence Christiano, Martin Eichebaum and Sergio Rebelo, who argue that the fiscal multipliers become very large (and positive) when nominal interest rates are close to zero. Who is to believe? Both use a rather elaborate DSGE model, in both cases estimated. Both use the Calvo fairy. Or a Taylor rule. The first has financial frictions, while the second has investment adjustment costs, which should come to the same. If anybody can figure out why the results are so different, I would appreciate it.
It particular it would be interesting to understand why now would now be the wrong time to institute an austerity regime. To me, it would even make perfect business sense: why not build infrastructure when the cost in terms of financing and labor are low? Keep in mind that every unemployed worker that is hired does not need unemployment benefits...
Thorsten Drautzburg and Harald Uhlig study a situation similar to the one now in the Unites States: nominal interest rates getting very close to zero. Then, they claim the fiscal multipliers are still rather small, but may be positive despite distortionary taxation. Now contrast this with the results of Lawrence Christiano, Martin Eichebaum and Sergio Rebelo, who argue that the fiscal multipliers become very large (and positive) when nominal interest rates are close to zero. Who is to believe? Both use a rather elaborate DSGE model, in both cases estimated. Both use the Calvo fairy. Or a Taylor rule. The first has financial frictions, while the second has investment adjustment costs, which should come to the same. If anybody can figure out why the results are so different, I would appreciate it.
It particular it would be interesting to understand why now would now be the wrong time to institute an austerity regime. To me, it would even make perfect business sense: why not build infrastructure when the cost in terms of financing and labor are low? Keep in mind that every unemployed worker that is hired does not need unemployment benefits...
Recessions are costly
Robert Lucas has pushed the idea that business cycles are not that costly that they would need intervention, and the real business cycle literature, at least the early one, has anyway advocated that the government should stay out of this kind of business. It is true that long term growth and understanding why some countries are so poor are more important questions, yet one cannot shake the feeling that recessions are costly. The recent one is more severe than usual and can highlight how its costs can be high, and those costs may persist for some time if the much longer than usual unemployment durations translate into significant losses in human capital and ultimately wages.
Steve Davis and Till von Wachter provide some new evidence of a somewhat different kind. Studying US workers displaced in mass-layoffs, they calculate the present value of a job loss in terms of pre-loss wage years. When the unemployment rate is below 6 percent, the loss is of 1.4 years. Above six percent, as is typical in a recession, the loss is 2.8 years, i.e., much much more than the increase in unemployment duration. One can only imagine that these numbers are going to be much worse for the last recession. And keep in mind that these higher numbers apply to more people in a recession. And it matters in aggregate: if the unemployment rate goes from 5 to 10%, it means 5% of the population loses 1.4 additional years of wages. That is 0.7% of national labor income, or 0.5% of GDP. Not peanuts, and I have not even factored in anything about curvature in utility.
Steve Davis and Till von Wachter provide some new evidence of a somewhat different kind. Studying US workers displaced in mass-layoffs, they calculate the present value of a job loss in terms of pre-loss wage years. When the unemployment rate is below 6 percent, the loss is of 1.4 years. Above six percent, as is typical in a recession, the loss is 2.8 years, i.e., much much more than the increase in unemployment duration. One can only imagine that these numbers are going to be much worse for the last recession. And keep in mind that these higher numbers apply to more people in a recession. And it matters in aggregate: if the unemployment rate goes from 5 to 10%, it means 5% of the population loses 1.4 additional years of wages. That is 0.7% of national labor income, or 0.5% of GDP. Not peanuts, and I have not even factored in anything about curvature in utility.
The recent collapse in the trade of durable goods
One important feature of the recent crisis has been a significant drop in international trade. There is nothing surprising in this, as it is a regular feature of recessions that imports decrease more than GDP, as they are mostly composed of intermediate and investment goods. And it is well known that investment is very volatile through the business cycle. This are all well-known facts, that are easy to replicate with standard international business cycle models.
Dimitra Petropoulou and Kwok Tong Soo look at this trade drop from the perspective of trade theorists. They use a small open economy model (hence prices are exogenous) with two-period overlapping generations (hence we are talking about long-term movements, not business cycles) with tradable durable goods and a non-tradable non-durable good. There is a fix endowment of labor and capital that can freely be allocated between sectors (hence there is no investment, or savings). Agents can freely borrow and lend within a generation, but not between generations or with abroad.
Why do I mention this? Because Petropoulou and Soo try to reinvent the wheel and make it square. There is a large international business cycle literature that has gone through all this with much more realistic assumption and delivered quantitative results. And this not the first time I see that trade theorists could learn a lot by reading a little bit outside their bubble.
Dimitra Petropoulou and Kwok Tong Soo look at this trade drop from the perspective of trade theorists. They use a small open economy model (hence prices are exogenous) with two-period overlapping generations (hence we are talking about long-term movements, not business cycles) with tradable durable goods and a non-tradable non-durable good. There is a fix endowment of labor and capital that can freely be allocated between sectors (hence there is no investment, or savings). Agents can freely borrow and lend within a generation, but not between generations or with abroad.
Why do I mention this? Because Petropoulou and Soo try to reinvent the wheel and make it square. There is a large international business cycle literature that has gone through all this with much more realistic assumption and delivered quantitative results. And this not the first time I see that trade theorists could learn a lot by reading a little bit outside their bubble.
Religion as an insurance mechanism against aggregate shocks
I have never been fond of the claims that the world is better with religion. The principal claim is that religion gives hope for people in dire circumstances, and thus in Economic terms increases their utility despite having hit the budget constraint. But one could also argue that these people are being mislead, as religion provides them with subjective probabilities that are far off the objective ones, all the while making the budget constraint even tighter because of the tithe and other material donations.
Olga Popova studies whether this effect of religion on happiness not only applies to individual circumstances, but also for aggregate shocks. Looking at the transition countries, which each suffered through substantial falls in GDP after the collapse of the Soviet rule, more religious people suffered, in terms of happiness, less than others from the large economic reforms. Of course, it is easy to understand that for most, they were happier than circumstances would indicate because it was rather obvious that things would eventually improve, likely a lot. The question is why religious would believe this more? Because they are easily indoctrinated, and it is certainly true that there was a lot of excessive pro-market rhetoric at the time. Non-religious people were probably more among the skeptics. And they were also more likely to be among those who benefited from the previous regime, which definitely oppressed religion. Unfortunately, this study does not take (previous) party affiliation into account, which is likely very (negatively) correlated with religiosity. Too bad.
Olga Popova studies whether this effect of religion on happiness not only applies to individual circumstances, but also for aggregate shocks. Looking at the transition countries, which each suffered through substantial falls in GDP after the collapse of the Soviet rule, more religious people suffered, in terms of happiness, less than others from the large economic reforms. Of course, it is easy to understand that for most, they were happier than circumstances would indicate because it was rather obvious that things would eventually improve, likely a lot. The question is why religious would believe this more? Because they are easily indoctrinated, and it is certainly true that there was a lot of excessive pro-market rhetoric at the time. Non-religious people were probably more among the skeptics. And they were also more likely to be among those who benefited from the previous regime, which definitely oppressed religion. Unfortunately, this study does not take (previous) party affiliation into account, which is likely very (negatively) correlated with religiosity. Too bad.
Spain: an eventful history of economic crises
There is talk that Spain could get dragged into a financial crisis. While it is debatable whether this will happen or not, and whether it is inevitable, it is instructive to study Spain's economic history in this regard.
Concha Betrán, Pablo Martín-‐Aceña and María Pons look at a century and a half of data and basically do in more details for Spain what Carmen Reinhardt and Kenneth Rogoff did for many countries in their best seller. And as the latter book, the picture is depressing. Crises of all sorts were a rather regular occurrence, we have been just blessed with rather few of them over the last half century. For example, in the second half of the 2oth century, Spain experiences half a dozen currency crises, a couple of banking crises, three periods with negative stock returns over several years, and the IMF had to intervene three times for a debt crisis. It takes from this that while crises are becoming less frequent, they still occur, and the current one was long overdue.
Concha Betrán, Pablo Martín-‐Aceña and María Pons look at a century and a half of data and basically do in more details for Spain what Carmen Reinhardt and Kenneth Rogoff did for many countries in their best seller. And as the latter book, the picture is depressing. Crises of all sorts were a rather regular occurrence, we have been just blessed with rather few of them over the last half century. For example, in the second half of the 2oth century, Spain experiences half a dozen currency crises, a couple of banking crises, three periods with negative stock returns over several years, and the IMF had to intervene three times for a debt crisis. It takes from this that while crises are becoming less frequent, they still occur, and the current one was long overdue.
Monetary and fiscal policy cooperation in a liquidity trap
We are living interesting times in terms of macroeconomic policy: the world faces big shocks and substantial challenges, and many current circumstances have no historical precedents. This means that policy makers cannot draw from experience and need to invent new policies from somewhere better than their guts. And after a few hesitations, theory is now in much better shape to answer questions from policy makers. For example, what should one do when there is a liquidity trap in a globalized economy, especially if the trap itself is globalized?
David Cook and Michael Devereux show how, and it borders on a political miracle. Not only does one need to get the cooperation of fiscal and monetary authorities (something the US is not close to achieving) but one needs the cooperation across countries even if it entails some costs to the "winners" (something the Chinese have so far refused and the Swiss recently abandoned).
Specifically, Cook and Devereux show that with so many countries currently with negative real interest rates, we have a worldwide liquidity trap. In an open economy, the policy prescription differs from a closed economy. If there is a negative demand shock, fiscal policy needs of course to raise aggregate demand, but with a global economy, this can come from anywhere in the world and thus a coordinated fiscal policy is due. But to channel the impulse to the relevant countries, monetary policy coordination is necessary to raise interest rates in the foreign countries, even if they are in a liquidity trap. And this takes some serious courage. One can always dream.
David Cook and Michael Devereux show how, and it borders on a political miracle. Not only does one need to get the cooperation of fiscal and monetary authorities (something the US is not close to achieving) but one needs the cooperation across countries even if it entails some costs to the "winners" (something the Chinese have so far refused and the Swiss recently abandoned).
Specifically, Cook and Devereux show that with so many countries currently with negative real interest rates, we have a worldwide liquidity trap. In an open economy, the policy prescription differs from a closed economy. If there is a negative demand shock, fiscal policy needs of course to raise aggregate demand, but with a global economy, this can come from anywhere in the world and thus a coordinated fiscal policy is due. But to channel the impulse to the relevant countries, monetary policy coordination is necessary to raise interest rates in the foreign countries, even if they are in a liquidity trap. And this takes some serious courage. One can always dream.
Who spent the 2001 Bush tax rebate?
Do tax rebate such as those implemented at various times by the Bush II administration work? Measuring this is not obvious. Previous studies have typically exploited the timing of the receipt of the rebate checks to see how expenses have changed. But most people have anticipated these payments, thus the marginal propensity to consume is mismeasured: it measures the propensity to consume due to short-term liquidity considerations beyond the consumption response from the announcement of the program.
Greg Kaplan and Giovanni Violante go a step further in this analysis and build a model that replicates the measurements found in the literature and the large share of hand-to-mouth households using an economy of liquid and illiquid assets with transaction costs. They define hand-to-mouth households as those who hold less that half their periodic pay in liquid assets. That seems very shaky to measure, as the timing of the relevant survey matters a lot here. But assuming there is no systematic error, they then extrapolate through the model what the response from the announcement of the rebate should have been. This adds 7-8% to the marginal propensity to consume. Interestingly, this come in large part form rich household who have only little liquid wealth because their assets are mostly in real estate and retirements funds. An important consequence of this is that larger tax rebates would have little impact, as they would make it more interesting to bear the costs of putting them into illiquid wealth. In fact, the marginal propensity to consume could even turn negative.
Greg Kaplan and Giovanni Violante go a step further in this analysis and build a model that replicates the measurements found in the literature and the large share of hand-to-mouth households using an economy of liquid and illiquid assets with transaction costs. They define hand-to-mouth households as those who hold less that half their periodic pay in liquid assets. That seems very shaky to measure, as the timing of the relevant survey matters a lot here. But assuming there is no systematic error, they then extrapolate through the model what the response from the announcement of the rebate should have been. This adds 7-8% to the marginal propensity to consume. Interestingly, this come in large part form rich household who have only little liquid wealth because their assets are mostly in real estate and retirements funds. An important consequence of this is that larger tax rebates would have little impact, as they would make it more interesting to bear the costs of putting them into illiquid wealth. In fact, the marginal propensity to consume could even turn negative.
The impact of fiscal uncertainty
Current US fiscal policy is absolutely frustrating. There does seem to be a clear direction, in particular because policy making is rather irrational due to a set of unduly influential and crazy lawmakers. In the end, this means considerable uncertainty about future fiscal policy, in particular because it may not react to economic events in ways that make economic or historic sense. What is the impact of such uncertainty?
Jesús Fernández-Villaverde, Pablo Guerrón-Quintana, Keith Kuester and Juan Rubio-Ramirez address this with a New Keynesian business cycle model that feature variable volatility in fiscal policy. Their conclusion is that the current uncertainty lowers activity and has the policy equivalent of a 25 basis point increase in the federal funds rate, which I find rather minor. The model rightfully yields that the main mechanism is through investment and the uncertainty on capital return taxation. I find it interesting that it leads to stagflation, as firm opt for higher prices to reduce miss-pricing costs. In the end, the authors show that if one removes the usual automatic stabilizers and assume very persistent fiscal shocks, which may be a good characterization of the current situation, the prediction is a 0.5% reduction in output, which I am ready to believe.
Jesús Fernández-Villaverde, Pablo Guerrón-Quintana, Keith Kuester and Juan Rubio-Ramirez address this with a New Keynesian business cycle model that feature variable volatility in fiscal policy. Their conclusion is that the current uncertainty lowers activity and has the policy equivalent of a 25 basis point increase in the federal funds rate, which I find rather minor. The model rightfully yields that the main mechanism is through investment and the uncertainty on capital return taxation. I find it interesting that it leads to stagflation, as firm opt for higher prices to reduce miss-pricing costs. In the end, the authors show that if one removes the usual automatic stabilizers and assume very persistent fiscal shocks, which may be a good characterization of the current situation, the prediction is a 0.5% reduction in output, which I am ready to believe.
Public consumption and the business cycle
One aspect of government purchases the current crisis has highlighted is how volatile they can be. Quite obviously, they are influenced by politics, to the point of complete reversal between massive spending and severe belt-tightening within months as in the US and the UK. But there could also be a more systematic component that is linked to the business cycle. After all, the government may be trying to improve the welfare of its constituents and for example substitute public consumption for lacking private consumption, or the same for investment.
Ruediger Bachmann and Jinhui Bai look at this using an augmented real business cycle model. They claim that 25-40% of the variance of public consumption can be accounted for by shocks to total factor productivity once implementation lags and costs of public consumption, as well as taste shocks to public vs. private consumption. I am no particular fan of taste shocks, as they are the symptoms of a modeler who is giving up on trying to explain something and simply equates the error term in the Euler equation to a shock. Then much is driven by how this shock is calibrated, in this case to match a four year electoral cycle and some data moments. When I think about shocks in this context, I think indeed about who is in power to decide on public expenditures. But that is not completely exogenous. Indeed, the state of the economy has an impact on who gets elected or reelected. And this can be calibrated without trying to match the data moments one is trying to explain.
Ruediger Bachmann and Jinhui Bai look at this using an augmented real business cycle model. They claim that 25-40% of the variance of public consumption can be accounted for by shocks to total factor productivity once implementation lags and costs of public consumption, as well as taste shocks to public vs. private consumption. I am no particular fan of taste shocks, as they are the symptoms of a modeler who is giving up on trying to explain something and simply equates the error term in the Euler equation to a shock. Then much is driven by how this shock is calibrated, in this case to match a four year electoral cycle and some data moments. When I think about shocks in this context, I think indeed about who is in power to decide on public expenditures. But that is not completely exogenous. Indeed, the state of the economy has an impact on who gets elected or reelected. And this can be calibrated without trying to match the data moments one is trying to explain.
Convergence in recessions
Growth theory and data teach us that, at least in developed countries, economies tend to converge in the long run: the dispersion across regions or nations of per capita income (or similar indicators) tends to decline. While this is a long term phenomenon, there is a priori no reason to believe this is a constant process.
Eldon Ball, Carlos San Juan and Camilo Ulloa study total factor productivity in agriculture across US states. While they indeed find a general trend towards convergence, it turns out that its speed is much faster during recessions. Why would this happen? If we follow Schumpeter, the worst firms should be dropping out during a recession, thereby relatively increasing TFP in the worst areas. And voilà, you have faster convergence. But only farm-level data would tell whether my conjecture is true.
Eldon Ball, Carlos San Juan and Camilo Ulloa study total factor productivity in agriculture across US states. While they indeed find a general trend towards convergence, it turns out that its speed is much faster during recessions. Why would this happen? If we follow Schumpeter, the worst firms should be dropping out during a recession, thereby relatively increasing TFP in the worst areas. And voilà, you have faster convergence. But only farm-level data would tell whether my conjecture is true.
Policy risk and the business cycle
The US economy seems stuck in its tracks, and many blame uncertainty about future public policy, including me. Indeed, private firms are currently sitting on a lot of cash and are making very good profits, yet they are not investing or hiring. This really looks like a wait-and-see game. But it this justification well-founded or is it just a cheap excuse to justify higher than usual profits in the face of high unemployment?
Benjamin Born and Johannes Pfeifer put some structure into these arguments by taking a standard New Keynesian model and adding uncertainty about monetary and fiscal policy. They measure this by looking at tax rates and monetary policy shocks with time-varying volatility. Previous literature already looked at the impact of aggregate uncertainty, which policy makers can do little about. But policy uncertainty is another matter. And there is hope, as Born and Pfeifer show that the impact of policy uncertainty is not that important (but much larger than uncertainty about productivity shocks) thanks to monetary policy reaction through a Taylor Rule. So that is somewhat reassuring, but then the size of the current policy uncertainty is an order of magnitude larger than when this paper was written, and monetary policy is bound by non-negative nominal interest rates.
Benjamin Born and Johannes Pfeifer put some structure into these arguments by taking a standard New Keynesian model and adding uncertainty about monetary and fiscal policy. They measure this by looking at tax rates and monetary policy shocks with time-varying volatility. Previous literature already looked at the impact of aggregate uncertainty, which policy makers can do little about. But policy uncertainty is another matter. And there is hope, as Born and Pfeifer show that the impact of policy uncertainty is not that important (but much larger than uncertainty about productivity shocks) thanks to monetary policy reaction through a Taylor Rule. So that is somewhat reassuring, but then the size of the current policy uncertainty is an order of magnitude larger than when this paper was written, and monetary policy is bound by non-negative nominal interest rates.
Fiscal policy as insurance
The goal of fiscal policy is at the macroeconomic level to steer the economy towards efficiency and, depending on the country, to smooth somewhat economic fluctuations. It has long been debated whether this is desirable or possible at all, given the large delays in implementing public expenses. But changes to tax policies are quicker to put in place and implement. At the microeconomic level, the focus is more on the long term, again try to attain better efficiency as well to optimize some definition of fairness across economic agents, however this may be defined in the respective countries. These micro and macro aspects have largely been regarded as separate. This does need to be so.
Eduardo Engel, Christopher Neilson and Rodrigo Valdés look at the particular fiscal policy of Chile. This country is characterized, like many emerging economies, by wild fluctuations in economic activity. In this case this is triggered by changes in commodity prices, in particular for copper. The most important implication is that government revenue varies wildly (a macroeconomic impact) between 1 and 8% of GDP, which changes Chile's ability to redistributes across heterogeneous households (a microeconomic impact). Adhering to a balanced budget rule would have a dramatic effect, in terms of aggregate welfare it would be like renouncing to half of the copper revenue. The reason is that households' incomes is also correlated with copper revenue, and a countercyclical policy is then optimal. And to be the most effective, the poorest households are helped in hard times, both because they have the highest marginal utility from consumption and because they have the highest propensity to consume.
Chile has been pursuing so far something that is close to a balanced budget rule: expenses are related to a permanent income measure of income. This means expenses are relatively constant, except for the last years, where expenses grew significantly despite a reduction in copper prices. This appears to have worked well, in particular because the poor have been the target of this largesse, not the rich. That was stimulus spending done right. This paper shows how this can be done even better.
Eduardo Engel, Christopher Neilson and Rodrigo Valdés look at the particular fiscal policy of Chile. This country is characterized, like many emerging economies, by wild fluctuations in economic activity. In this case this is triggered by changes in commodity prices, in particular for copper. The most important implication is that government revenue varies wildly (a macroeconomic impact) between 1 and 8% of GDP, which changes Chile's ability to redistributes across heterogeneous households (a microeconomic impact). Adhering to a balanced budget rule would have a dramatic effect, in terms of aggregate welfare it would be like renouncing to half of the copper revenue. The reason is that households' incomes is also correlated with copper revenue, and a countercyclical policy is then optimal. And to be the most effective, the poorest households are helped in hard times, both because they have the highest marginal utility from consumption and because they have the highest propensity to consume.
Chile has been pursuing so far something that is close to a balanced budget rule: expenses are related to a permanent income measure of income. This means expenses are relatively constant, except for the last years, where expenses grew significantly despite a reduction in copper prices. This appears to have worked well, in particular because the poor have been the target of this largesse, not the rich. That was stimulus spending done right. This paper shows how this can be done even better.
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